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Cyber War or Monkey Business? 
JAMES J. WIRTZ 
Brandon Valeriano and Ryan C. Maness: Cyber War versus Cyber Realities 
Oxford University Press, New York, 2015, 266 p., $29.95. 
Between 4 and 7 September 2001, I 
attended the First Biennial Threat 
Reduction Conference that was 
sponsored by the Defense Threat 
Reduction Agency in Norfolk, 
Virginia. One of the panels featured 
a debate about the likelihood of 
mass casualty terrorism in the 
United States. One panelist asserted 
that such an event was unlikely—the 
Aum Shinrikyo sarin attack being a 
case in point. Although well-funded 
and left relatively unmolested by the 
authorities, cultists managed to kill 
only 13 people when they released a 
nerve agent in the Tokyo subway. 
Thus, inflicting mass casualties, 
even with sarin, was not easily 
accomplished. The threat of mass 
casualty terrorism was being 
exaggerated by scholars and pundits 
alike, the panelist asserted, urging 
the conferees to instead focus on 
plausible threats. The other panelist 
agreed that Aum Shinrikyo was 
inept but offered the obvious 
counterpoint: just because something 
has not occurred in the past does not 
guarantee that it will not occur in 
the future. 
The next morning, I contemplated 
this wonderfully “academic” debate 
on a pleasant United Airlines flight 
from Dulles to San Francisco. Soon 
afterwards it occurred to me that 
when it comes to picking an itinerary 
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or making observations about the 
future, timing is everything. 
DOUBTING THE THREAT HYPE 
Brandon Valeriano and Ryan Maness 
acknowledge the “timing” problem 
inherent in their well-reasoned and 
empirically based assessment of state 
cyber conflicts that occurred between 
2001 and 2011. Nevertheless, in 
their view, cyber war is mostly 
hype, created by over-imaginative 
academics and a cyber security 
industry ready to profit from cyber 
anxieties. By contrast, their analysis 
reveals that, at least in the period 
considered, cyber conflict was limited 
in both scope and severity, and was 
largely characterized by espionage 
or hooliganism (defacement of 
government websites) that generally 
produced no lasting impact. They 
note that in the vast majority of 
cases the incompetence of the victim 
or the aid of a witting or unwitting 
accomplice had facil itated 
penetration of some system. Here the 
2015 hack of the U.S. Office 
of Personnel Management, which 
compromised the personal  
information of just about everyone 
who had ever applied for or 
possessed a U.S. security clearance, 
comes to mind. The Stuxnet attack 
against Iranian centrifuges, an 
outlier in their database, is used to 
illustrate their fundamental point: 
that the use of cyber warfare to 
inflict real damage is a rare and 
extraordinarily difficult endeavor 
that is probably within the technical 
reach of only a few states. 
Valeriano and Maness also back up 
their empirical observations with 
some theoretical musings about why 
the reality of cyber warfare is out 
of step with the cyber hype 
surrounding the issue. Zero-day 
exploits (using heretofore unknown 
system vulnerabilities) are fleeting in 
their efficacy; once revealed, they are 
quickly rectified. Because they begin 
to lose their effectiveness soon after 
they are employed, the tendency is 
to keep one’s powder dry, so to 
speak. Moreover, aggressive viruses 
can either propagate uncontrollably 
across the Internet or be repackaged 
and returned to the sender with 
unpredictable consequences. Because 
predicting the impact of more 
aggressive cyber attacks is difficult, 
states tend to exhibit restraint in their 
use of cyber weapons. Put somewhat 
differently, weapons that are likely to 
produce collateral damage or even 
fratricide are not readily embraced 
by military professionals. Although 
the authors do not mention it, 
attitudes toward the use of cyber 
weapons seem to mirror the history 
of biological warfare. Unleashing 
contagion is highly unpredictable; 
weapons with unknowable effects 
have little military utility. They might 
produce their intended impact, but 
there is no telling how far disease 
might spread. Because the same can 
be said for cyber weapons, restraint 
characterizes the way states engage in 
cyber conflict. 
Another theoretical insight offered 
by Valeriano and Maness is that 
cyber conflict is both profoundly 
political and strategic. Conflict is 
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centered on a set of enduring rivalries: 
India and Pakistan, China and Japan, 
Russia and member states of the 
former Soviet Union, the United 
States and China, and the United 
States and Iran. With the exception 
of Stuxnet, these incidents tend to be 
limited, matching the “short-of-war” 
levels of acrimony present in these 
relationships. These observations 
are important because some 
policymakers and scholars tend to 
focus on what might happen in 
cyberspace, not why it might happen. 
For instance, it is theoretically 
possible to temporarily bring down 
the power grid in the United States, 
or to disrupt the stock market, or to 
cripple the banking system, creating 
significant disruption or even loss 
of life. But in focusing on these 
scenarios observers fail to stipulate 
the strategic purpose or the political 
setting that would motivate the 
launch of a highly devastating cyber 
attack. Admittedly, for those on the 
front lines of cyber defense, it might 
appear that the world has descended 
into a feral state of nature as they 
monitor thousands of attempts daily 
to hack into protected networks. 
Nevertheless, Valeriano and Maness 
correctly note that no one has yet 
died in a cyber attack, a requirement 
needed to turn an incident into a 
“war.” In a political and strategic 
sense, the world has not yet 
witnessed cyber war. 
ALTERING THE SCENARIO 
So, what could alter the relatively 
benign picture of cyber conflict 
portrayed in Cyber War versus Cyber 
Realities? Valeriano and Maness 
would suggest that the future will 
mirror the past because cyber attacks 
are difficult to calibrate, execute, and 
control and generally do little more 
than create another round of cyber 
hype. Restraint will continue to 
characterize the emergence of cyber 
conflict in international affairs. 
Nevertheless, two considerations 
embedded in their analysis might 
temper expectations that the past 
will resemble the future regarding 
cyber conflict. 
First, they embrace a U.S.-centric 
view of cyber warfare. They tend to 
treat cyber as a precision-guided 
weapon that can produce asymmetric 
physical effects by targeting key 
nodes or systems. Stuxnet is the 
quintessential example of this sort of 
attack—some well-placed computer 
code managed to temporarily 
sabotage the Iranian reprocessing 
effort. Nevertheless, other national 
“styles” have emerged when it comes 
to cyber conflict, giving doubt that 
the American approach is the most 
effective way to employ cyber as a 
weapon. The Russians, for example, 
see cyber as a truly strategic weapon, 
one intended to shape the political 
landscape in a way that suits the 
Kremlin’s interests. Moscow devotes 
an enormous amount of effort to 
shaping content on the World Wide 
Web to skew stories and opinion to 
correspond to its view of the world 
and facilitate Russian foreign policy. 
The apparent Russian hack of the 
Democratic National Committee 
during the 2016 U.S. presidential 
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campaign is a case in point. Even 
though the hack constituted a 
minimum severity attack according 
to the threat matrix developed by 
Valeriano and Maness, it constituted 
a strategic use of a cyber weapon 
that might have produced a 
profound political impact, shaping 
the international setting to Moscow’s 
liking. Additionally, China’s “Great 
Wall” approach to cyber conflict, 
whereby the regime tightly controls 
its own domestic cyber space while 
working relentlessly to ferret out the 
(sometimes mundane) secrets of 
others, often appears quirky if not 
downright misguided. Nevertheless, 
as I consider the dystopia reflected 
on my Facebook feed, which is 
filled with partisan propaganda, fake 
news, and all sorts of social, class, 
and political agitation, the Chinese 
way of managing the World Wide 
Web appears less misguided. 
Beijing’s approach to cyber conflict 
is an appropriate response to the 
agitprop generated on social media 
by domestic opposition movements 
or foreign sources (e.g., the Russian 
approach to cyber war). Cyber 
warfare, when it takes the form of 
something other than a precision- 
strike, might be where future cyber 
conflict is heading. The severity scale 
used by Valeriano and Maness to 
judge the threat posed by cyber 
conflict might need recalibration. 
Second, and more telling, is the 
observation that even though Cyber 
War versus Cyber Realities cites 
technical and operational limitations 
as the primary source of cyber 
restraint, another factor might be 
moderating behavior in cyber 
space. Specifically, relatively benign 
political relations, not technical 
constraints, might be limiting the 
severity of cyber attacks. In other 
words, Valeriano and Maness are 
quite correct to tie the occurrence of 
cyber attacks to enduring rivalries— 
states do not harass other states 
“just because they can.” 
Nevertheless, if these rivalries heat 
up, could an increase in the severity 
and impact of cyber conflict be 
expected? The relatively benign cyber 
conflicts that occurred between 2001 
and 2011 might have been the 
product of a peaceful period in these 
rivalries, not the product of technical 
and operational constraints that are 
likely to restrain cyber attacks 
even in a deteriorating situation. 
Although states have not gone “all 
in” when regarding cyber war, 
the reality is that the political 
motivations for the eruption of full- 
scale hostilities have not been present 
either. Moderate political relations 
could easily account for the relatively 
benign nature of cyber conflict 
during the period considered by 
Valeriano and Maness. 
Cyber War versus Cyber Realities 
makes a real contribution to the 
literature on cyber conflict by 
suggesting that, so far at least, cyber 
does not constitute a “silver bullet” 
when it comes to conflict. It also 
demonstrates that predictions of a 
coming Cyber Pearl Harbor must be 
tied to realistic strategic and political 
settings in order to be credible. 
Vulnerabilities are known, attack 
methods can be identified, and the 
INTERNATIONAL  JOURNAL  OF  INTELLIGENCE 
418 BOOK  REVIEWS 
strategic impact of a successful cyber 
attack can be estimated in advance. 
What remains to be determined is 
when officials might feel politically 
compelled to take a gamble by going 
all in on cyber. To suggest how to 
make that prediction is difficult, but 
it is something to think about on 
that next flight from Dulles to San 
Francisco.    
Once More into Laos 
J. RANSOM CLARK 
Joshua Kurlantzick: A Great Place to Have a War: America in Laos and the Birth 
of a Military CIA 
Simon & Schuster, New York, 2016, 323 p., $28.00. 
Joshua Kurlantzick provides a 
reasonably accurate (though not 
complete) view of the U.S. 
involvement in Laos from 1961 to 
1975. Given the substantial body of 
existing literature detailing and 
dissecting the U.S. effort in Laos, 
however, to ask whether yet another 
assessment is needed is not unkind. 
To put it another way, is there 
anything new in his A Great Place to 
Have a War: America in Laos and the 
Birth of a Military CIA? Although 
the basic answer to that question is 
“not really,” Kurlantzick does offer 
two “hooks” in seeking to bring 
some originality to the discussion. 
First, he asserts that the war in Laos 
gave birth to today’s “militarized” 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA); 
and second, he weaves into his 
narrative the roles and personalities 
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